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MARKET EFFICIENCY AND MARKETING TO ENHANCE INCOME 
OF CROP PRODUCERS 
ABSTRACT 
Recent changes in farm policy have renewed interest in using marketing strategies based on 
futures and options markets to enhance the income of field crop producers. This article 
reviews the literature surrounding the dominant academic theory of the behavior of futures and 
options markets, the efficient market hypothesis. The following conclusion is reached: while 
individuals can beat the market, few can consistently do so. This conclusion is consistent with 
Grossman and Stiglitz's model of market efficiency in which individuals who consistently earn 
trading returns have superior access to information or superior analytical ability. One 
implication is that, with few exceptions, the crop producers who survive will be those with the 
lowest cost of production since efforts to improve revenue through better marketing will have 
limited success. There do appear to be some successful marketing strategies. One is to base 
storage decisions on when a producer harvests the crop relative to the national harvest of the 
crop. Another is to base storage decisions on whether the current basis exceeds the cost of 
storage, and then to use hedging to assure an expected positive return. 
MARKET EFFICIENCY AND MARKETING TO ENHANCE INCOME 
OF CROP PRODUCERS 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of futures and, more recently, option markets to enhance income long has been 
a topic of interest to agricultural producers and others, as well as the subject of many academic 
investigations (Tomek, 1987). This topic has taken on new importance because of the recent 
changes in farm policy. These changes reduce the role of government in determining prices 
and incomes earned by producing the major field crops (Nelson and Schertz, 1996). Given 
this new context, we review the main concepts of the dominant academic theory concerning 
the behavior of futures and options markets, the efficient market hypothesis. This rich 
conceptual base and associated empirical research has several, important insights regarding 
who should be able to profit from futures and options trading, and what strategies should be 
profitable. 
MAJOR CONCEPTS OF EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
According to Fama (1970, updated 1991) an efficient market is one that accurately 
incorporates all known information in determining price1• Fama's original definition came to 
be known as the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). It is essentially an extension of the zero 
profit equilibrium of a competitive market in a certain world to an uncertain world of price 
dynamics. Although considerable disagreement exists about the degree to which EMH holds, 
it has become the dominant paradigm used by economists to understand and investigate the 
behavior of financial and commodity markets2 • 
The following equation allows a simple discussion of the major concepts underlying the 
EMH: 
(1) Pt+t = a + PPt + E0 
where Pt+t is the price at time t + 1, Pt is the current price, a and Pare parameters, and Et is a 
random error term which is independently and identically distributed with mean 0 and constant 
variance 0 2• To aid in understanding EMH, equation (1) is rearranged as follows: 
(2) Pt+• - PP1 = a + E1 
If a = 0 and P = 1, then 
(3) Pt+! - pl = El 
Last, taking the expectation of equation (3) yields: 
(4) E1(P1+1 - P J = 0 
The price process described above is usually referred to as a random walk3 (Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay, 1997; Tomek and Querin, 1984). The expected average change in price is zero. 
Hence, no price bias exists. Furthermore, since the E/s are uncorrelated, changes in prices are 
uncorrelated. A commonly used analogy of a random walk is the flipping of a fair coin. 
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) point out that two other versions of the random 
walk hypothesis exist. One version relaxes the assumptions on E1 so that it is independent but 
not identically distributed. This version allows for heteroskedasticity, a condition often found 
in commodity futures prices. The second and most general version relaxes the independence 
assumption, so that the E/s may be dependent, but uncorrelated. 
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It is common for individuals to visualize the random walk as a jagged line around some 
initial value, with the high and low values of this line not far from the initial value. Stated 
alternatively, the random walk does not deviate much from its initial value, and returns to its 
initial value after relatively few observations (for a general discussion of this small-number 
phenomenon see Tversky and Kahneman (1971)). In contrast, a well-accepted finding from 
random walk experiments is that a random walk can deviate substantially from its initial value 
and that the number of observations before the random walk returns to its initial value can be 
large. Thus, long periods of "trends" and even longer periods of deviation from its initial 
value are consistent with a random walk. 
A fundamental principle of modern finance is that higher risk should be compensated 
with a higher return. Furthermore, if a risk exists that can not be diversified, an activity 
associated with that risk should earn a return which exceeds the risk-free rate of return. Thus, 
if buying or selling futures and/or options of a specific commodity incurs a risk which can not 
be diversified, that commodity's futures or option market could be efficient in terms of Fama's 
definition and have a price bias, i.e., E1(P1+ 1) - P1 ' 0, provided the bias is a compensation for 
risk. 
A convenient way of thinking about price bias is to use terminology introduced by 
Keynes (1930). He divided price biases into normal backwardation and contango. In normal 
backwardation, the expected price is lower than the realized price. If this situation exists, 
futures prices should increase over the course of a contract, resulting in positive trading returns 
to a long position. In a contango, the reverse is true, and the expected price is higher than the 
realized price. Hence, a short futures position will earn positive trading returns. 
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To summarize this discussion, there are two versions of Fama efficiency. In the first, 
a. = 0 and p = 1. In the second, a. :t= 0 and P = 1, provided a non-zero a. is a return to risk. 
The second situation is commonly referred to as a random walk with drift. Normal 
backwardation implies that a. > 0, while contango implies that a < 0. These price biases 
may be constant over time or may vary over time. The existence of price biases is extremely 
controversial, but, whatever the investigator's belief, their existence is an empirical, not 
conceptual, question. 
Violations of Fama's Assumptions 
Fama assumed no transaction costs, costless information, and that the implications of 
current information for both current price and the distributions of future prices are generally 
accepted by all market participants. At least two assumptions are unrealistic. First, 
transaction costs, such as brokerage fees, exist. The existence of transaction costs changes the 
criteria by which market efficiency is evaluated: a market is efficient if gross trading returns 
do not exceed transaction costs. Second, information is costly to acquire and analyze. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show that, if information is costly, it is impossible for 
prices to perfectly reflect all available information. Otherwise, those who use resources to 
obtain information would earn no compensation to cover their costs of acquiring and analyzing 
it. This insight introduces a potential avenue for profitable trading. Profit can be earned by 
using information and analysis to take a position in anticipation of price changes which will 
occur as the rest of the market learns about the information. These trading returns represent a 
return to the costs incurred in acquiring and analyzing information. 
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Grossman and Stiglitz's model has come to be known as noisy rational expectations4 • 
Relative to Fama's model of market efficiency, it implies that P may not equal 1 because the 
market acquires and analyzes information (i.e., learns) slowly, with traders possessing superior 
access to information and/or analyt~cal ability acquiring information first. It also implies an 
alternative statement of market efficiency: a market is efficient with respect to the information 
set available at time t provided economic returns generated by trading on this information set 
do not exceed transaction and information costs (Jensen, 1978). 
IMPLICATIONS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY FOR MARKETING STRATEGIES 
For pedagogical purposes, we classify the different strategies employed in the 
marketing of commodities5 , including field crops, into four categories: routine strategies, 
systematic strategies, strategies based on market-generated forecasts, and strategies based on 
individual-generated forecasts. These four categories are discussed below. 
Routine Strategies 
A routine strategy is one that involves buying or selling at the same time during the 
production process. Because of their passive and unconditional nature, routine strategies 
represent minimal input strategies. These attributes make the evaluation of routine strategies 
important because the routine strategy which yields the highest return becomes the benchmark 
against which active and conditional marketing strategies should be measured. 
One obvious and frequently-used routine strategy is to sell 100 percent of production at 
the end of the production period (i.e., harvest). Another routine strategy that has received 
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significant attention is to always sell a share of expected production before harvest. Such a 
strategy will enhance income if a contango exists ( a. < 0 and 13 = 1). On the other hand, if 
the futures or options market provides an unbiased forecast of subsequent prices (i.e., a. = O 
and 13 = 1), then the expected return from selling before harvest is zero. Hence, the success 
of routine selling before harvest depends on whether a price bias exists. 
A particular type of contango price bias, known as the drought risk premium (Wisner, 
1991), has been much discussed in recent years. This strategy is based on the argument that, 
during the period before harvest, crop futures and option prices will be priced in anticipation 
of a drought. Because a drought does not normally occur, futures prices will decline. By 
extension, routinely selling a futures or option contract before harvest should be profitable. 
We examine the drought risk premium for the pre-harvest quotes of corn and soybean 
new crop futures over the 1952-1996 period. Table 1 presents the difference between the 
November soybean and December corn futures quote on March 1, May 1, July 1, and 
September 1 and the quote on the following November 1 or December 1. November 1 and 
December 1 represent harvest, March 1 represents pre-planting, May 1 represents planting, 
July 1 represents the middle of the growing season, and September 1 represents the late 
growing season. A positive difference means the pre-harvest quote on average was greater 
than the harvest quote, while a negative number means the pre-harvest quote on average was 
less than the harvest quote. The differences are tested for statistical significance at the five 
percent level using a two-tailed test. Note that these comparisons do not account for 
transactions costs incurred when trading6 • 
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Over the entire 1952-1996 observation period, none of the pre-harvest quotes for corn 
and soybeans differed significantly from the harvest quote. Furthermore, none of the eight t-
statistics have a p-value which is less than 20 percent. When the observation period is divided 
in half, one t-statistic is significant at the five percent test level: soybeans, May 1, 1952-1973 
(-2.59). Over this period, November soybean futures prices increased significantly from May 
1 through November 1. When the observation period is split into fourths, three t-statistics are 
significant: corn, March 1, 1952-1962 (2.49); soybeans, May 1, 1963-1973 (-2.64); and 
soybeans, July 1, 1985-1996 (2.28). Two of these significant observations are consistent with 
contango, while the other is consistent with normal backwardation. 
The number of significant coefficients do not deviate by much from the laws of chance. 
For example, random chance implies that approximately 0.9 observations (16 times 0.05) 
over the two equally divided sub-periods should be significant at the five percent test level. 
One significant coefficient is observed. Similar results are obtained for the 32 cases when four 
sub-periods are used. Furthermore, among the significant coefficients, there is no consistent 
pattern of normal backwardation or contango. 
Table 2 presents the gross trading returns from buying September and November 
(December) soybean (corn) put options at the same four pre-harvest dates evaluated for 
futures. Because options expire during the month before the underlying futures contract 
expires, a September put option is not available on September 1. The put position was closed 
on the 15m day of the month before the underlying futures contract expires or the last day of 
trading, whichever came first. Again, trading costs were not included in the calculations. 
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The current option contracts did not begin trading until 1985 for corn and soybeans. 
Along with the 1985-1996 period, the 1990-1996 period is included because, following 
Grossman and Stiglitz, markets must learn how to price new contracts. Thus, reasons exist for 
believing that any new market can generate inaccurate pricing. 
Only one average gross trading return is significant at the 5 percent level: corn, July 1, 
September put, 1985-1996 (2.66). However, the comparable t-statistic for 1990-1996 is 
insignificant (1.27). In total, there is no consistent evidence of significant trading returns to 
the routine buying of a put before harvest. 
An issue is whether the results for the price bias analyses translates to the farm level 
decision making environment in which both yield and price vary. To evaluate transferability, 
farm level yields were collected for 21 farms operated by the University of Illinois over the 
1985-1995 period. Thursday cash prices are available for regions of the state (Good). The 
same strategies as discussed above were evaluated, but the only pre-harvest date used was May 
1. The futures and harvest put strategies are lifted at harvest, while .the September put strategy 
is closed out on the last day of trading but no later than August 15. Harvest is defined as the 
week in which 50 percent of the Illinois corn or soybean harvest was completed. 
The average return for all 21 farms from selling at harvest are presented in Table 3. 
Also presented is the average gross return associated with each pre-harvest marketing strategy, 
as well as the average t-statistic used to test the difference between gross returns from using 
the pre-harvest strategy and the gross return from selling at harvest. The average gross return 
is higher when the pre-harvest marketing strategies are used. However, using a five percent 
test level, none of the pre-harvest strategies yield a significantly higher return than selling at 
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harvest. Alexander (1996) found similar results for four Ohio farm situations examined over 
the 1985-1995 period. 
For comparative purposes, the per bushel gross returns generated by selling a futures 
contract or buying a put option on May 1 for the 1985-1995 period are presented. As 
expected, the results for these price bias tests are similar to the results for the farm level tests: 
the pre-harvest marketing strategies yield a higher return than selling at harvest, but the return 
is not significantly higher. 
The lack of a price bias in pre-harvest quotes of the corn and soybean harvest futures 
and options contracts without adjusting for transaction costs is consistent with Fama efficiency 
and with the view that over the preharvest period a = 0 and P = 1. Thus, from the view of 
enhancing income, routinely selling before harvest is no better than simply selling at harvest. 
Conversely, selling at harvest is no better than selling before harvest, if done routinely7 • 
Relative to the routine drought premium argument, our findings suggest that the corn 
and soybean futures and options markets incorporate the average economic value of a growing-
season drought into their pre-harvest estimate of the harvest price. Because a drought usually 
does not happen, it is not surprising that over the 1974-1996 period corn and soybean new 
crop futures declined two-thirds of the time between May 1 and November 1 (December 1) 
(Figures 1 and 2). However, the average price increase was much greater than the average 
price decrease (Figures 1 and 2). Thus, the price reaction to a drought is much larger than the 
price reaction to the lack of a drought. Putting these two observations together results in 
futures and options prices being unbiased predictors {i.e., (average price increase times the 
probability that price increased) minus (average price decrease times the probability that price 
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decreased) is not statistically different from zero}. Hence, while a trader can predict that corn 
and soybean prices will normally decline over the growing season, this information can not be 
used to trade profitably unless the trader can predict in which years price will increase and 
decrease. In other words, a trader must be able to predict a drought before it occurs. 
One last point: the observed bias in futures prices varied substantially from subperiod 
to subperiod. For example, over 1974-1984 the May 1 quote of the November soybean 
contract averaged 25 cents lower than the November 1 quote of the November contract (Table 
1). In contrast, over 1985-1996, the May 1 quote averaged 40 cents higher than the 
November 1 quote. Thus, a routine sell strategy would have generated substantial profits over 
1985-1996, but substantial loses over 1974-1984. This discussion emphasizes the importance 
of having an adequate sample size before projecting past price behavior into the future. It also 
urges extreme caution in drawing any conclusions regarding the performance of option based 
strategies, given that only 12 years of data exist. 
While routine pre-harvest strategies do not appear to enhance the income of crop 
farmers, other routine strategies may be profitable. Numerous studies have investigated 
whether normal backwardation or contango is a general feature of futures prices for different 
commodities. In contrast to the above analysis which focused only on the pre-harvest period 
of the harvest contract, these studies have included all contracts and contract trading periods. 
The most extensive study is by Kolb (1992). He investigated the existence of normal 
backwardation in daily prices of 29 futures markets from 1959 (or first year of trading) 
' 
through 1988. For the commodities of interest in this study, he found no evidence of normal 
backwardation or contango in corn, oats, or wheat futures contracts, but did find some 
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evidence of normal backwardation in cotton and soybeans8• A buy-and-hold strategy produced 
mean annual gross trading returns between 4.5 and 5.0 percent for cotton and soybeans. 
These returns were statistically significant at the five percent test level (Kolb, p. 81). These 
finding suggest that a producer should wait to sell cotton and soybeans as long as possible. 
Kolb's review of the literature reveals that the existence of a routine normal 
backwardation is sensitive to the time period analyzed. Also, Kolb does not account for the 
effect of overlapping sample periods or trading costs. Both of these considerations will reduce 
the confidence level associated with his results. Nevertheless, especially in regard to cotton 
and soybeans, Kolb's findings suggest that routine strategies need further investigation. 
If a farmer has not already sold the crop for delivery at harvest, the farmer must 
confront the issue of storage when the crop is harvested. Many farmers routinely store, but it 
is uncertain whether this makes sense given the well-known "j" shaped pattern of cash prices 
over the harvest period. Cash prices are high at the beginning of harvest, reach a low around 
the middle of harvest, then begin to climb as harvest winds down. This pattern suggest that 
returns to storage may depend on the time of harvest, and, thus, routine storage is not 
necessarily an income enhancing strategy. 
Returns to routine storage are presented in Figures 3 and 4 for corn produced in Ohio 
during the 1964-1995 crop years. Returns to storage are evaluated for the week in which 10, 
50, or 90 percent of Ohio's corn crop is normally harvested. The pace of the Ohio corn 
harvest generally follows the national harvest rate. Thus, the use of the Ohio rate of harvest 
allows us to jointly capture the national harvest rate as well. The 10, 50, and 90 percent 
completion rates vary by crop year, but usually fall during the first week of October, first 
11 
week of November, and last week of November. These usual dates are used for the analysis 
presented below because (1) the results are similar to those generated using the year-specific 
completion dates and (2) the presentation and interpretation of the results are simpler. 
Returns, net of interest and physical storage costs, are computed for both hedged and 
unhedged corn stored off the farm. The storage hedge was placed in the July futures contract9• 
Average net return to storage, whether hedged or unhedged, consistently is less than 
zero for crops harvested at the 10 percent harvest completion date. For crops harvested at the 
90 percent completion date, returns to storage are positive and significantly different from zero 
at the five percent test level only during the first month of storage. This finding is true for 
both hedged and unhedged storage. 
Net returns to both hedged and unhedged storage is greatest for corn harvested at the 50 
percent completion date. Except for storage until June, net average return for both hedged and 
unhedged storage varied around five cents per bushel, regardless of length of storage. Given 
the similarity in average returns for hedged and unhedged storage, it is important to note that 
the net returns to hedged storage were positive and significantly different from zero at the five 
percent test level for all periods until the end of May, while net returns to unhedged storage 
were significantly different from zero only during the period between December 1 and January 
15. This difference in significance is due almost entirely to the lower variation in the returns 
to hedged storage, especially over the longer storage horizons, and illustrates the well-known 
ability of hedging to reduce the earnings risk associated with storage. 
The routine strategy which generates the highest income should be used as the 
benchmark against which marketing programs are evaluated. For producers of field crops, the 
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benchmark appears to be harvest-time sales for those who harvest early. For those harvesting 
during the middle of the harvest season, the appropriate benchmark appears to include the 
return from routine storage. For those who harvest late, the benchmark appears to include the 
return to short-term storage of about one month in length. 
Systematic Strategies 
Systematic strategies base the buy /sell decision on the status of an indicator variable. 
Depending on the value of this indicator variable, the strategy may involve taking a long, 
short, or no position. In terms of the bias equation, these strategies are consistent with a 
situation in which a can take on any value, but P = 1. Thus, systematic strategies are 
consistent with market efficiency provided the relationship between a and the indicator 
variable is caused by a risk factor. In this situation, the risk factor varies over time. 
A systematic strategy which has received considerable attention in the literature is based 
on the argument that a hedging pressure risk premium exists. This argument was first stated 
by Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1946). It is based on the assumption that producers engage in 
hedging to reduce risk. Assuming that speculators are risk-averse, they will assume the risk 
being transferred by hedgers only if they are paid for doing so. Normal backwardation is a 
mechanism by which hedgers of cash commodities (i.e., short hedgers) pay speculators to 
assume the price risk avoided by hedging. By analogy, a contango is the mechanism by which 
long hedgers pay speculators to assume the price risk avoided by hedging (Cootner, 1960). 
These arguments imply that a long position will be profitable if hedgers are net short, while a 
short position will be profitable if hedgers are net long. 
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A recent examination of this issue is by Bessembinder (1992). He evaluates all 
contracts traded on 22 futures markets, including corn, cotton, soybeans, and wheat, over the 
period January 1967 through December 1989. He finds no relationship for soybeans and 
wheat between the net short and net long position of hedgers and mean gross trading returns. 
On the other hand, a statistically significant relationship at the five percent test level is found 
for corn and cotton. For corn, net trading returns to a long (short) position when hedgers are 
net short (long) for the entire month prior to taking the position is 16 percent (20 percent) 
expressed on an annual basis. For cotton, significant returns are found only when hedgers are 
net short for the entire month prior to the position being taken. Returns to a long position are 
28 percent expressed on an annual basis10• 
A second systematic strategy is to condition trading positions on the state of the 
economy. In the academic literature, this is frequently referred to as a time-varying macro-
economic risk premium. At present, the most comprehensive evaluation is by Bessembinder 
and Chan (1992). They investigated 12 futures markets over the period January 1975 to 
December 1989, including cotton, soybeans, and wheat. Returns on wheat and soybean 
futures were not significantly related at the five percent test level to the three macro-economic 
variable examined: three-month Treasury bill yield, dividend yield on a value-weighted equity 
index, and a measure of the 'junk bond" premium. For cotton, the three-month Treasury bill 
yield was significant at the five percent test level, as was the explanatory power of all three 
variables as a group. The sign on the Treasury bill variable was negative, implying that a 
reduction in Treasury bill yields was associated with a positive return to a long position. On 
an annual basis, this return was approximately five percent for each unit change in Treasury 
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bill yield. These results suggest that a time-varying macro-economic risk factor could exist for 
cotton, and, thus, provides the basis for a systematic hedging strategy11 • 
It is possible that other systematic strategies may be valid. A number of systematic 
price biases have been presented in the stock market literature. These include, among others, 
the firm size effect, the January effect, the weekend effect, and the Value-Line effect. For a 
more complete listing and discussion, see Gallinger and Poe (1995) and for a discussion of the 
evidence see Ball (1996) and Fama (1991). These systematic price biases lead to systematic 
trading strategies12 , such as always being long in the stock market during January. We would 
not be surprised if similar pricing biases exist in agricultural futures market; however, as of 
this time there is no convincing body of evidence that biases of the kind found in the stock 
markets exist in the futures markets for crops. 
In summary, evidence exists that for some field crop futures markets a hedging 
pressure risk premium and/or a time-varying risk premium tied to macro-economic variables 
may exist. In these instances, systematic hedging strategies could be timed to coincide with 
the values of these risk factors. However, the evidence is not consistent across all field crop 
futures markets, implying that the usefulness of such strategies vary by crop. 
Marketing Strategies Based on Market-Generated Forecasts 
This section discusses the academic evidence concerning marketing strategies based on 
a forecast of profits obtained by using futures and/or option prices. We divide these strategies 
into two categories: storage arbitrage and production response. 
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Storage arbitrage strategies were first discussed by Working (1953). In particular, he 
argued that the current futures-cash basis provides a market determined estimate of the 
expected return to storage. Working discussed this strategy in the context of storage at the 
futures market delivery poi~t. This allowed him to use the convergence of futures and cash 
markets during the futures delivery month, i.e., the basis becomes nearly zero. His storage 
strategy was to store until the delivery month only when the current futures-cash basis exceeds 
the cost of storing to the delivery month. Working also advocated the use of a hedge to assure 
that the expected storage return was earned. 
At non-delivery points or during non-delivery months, the storage agent can no longer 
rely on convergence to provide a near-certain expectation of the basis at the end of the storage 
period (i. e, zero). Hence, uncertainty is introduced into storage returns. One technique for 
estimating the expected basis at the end of the desired storage period is to use an average of 
past bases on the expected storage ending date. Working's basis strategy is then transformed 
into: store only when the current basis minus the historical average basis on the projected sell 
date exceeds the cost of storage13 • 
To examine Working's basis strategy over a long period of time at a non-delivery 
point, we evaluated the returns to corn storage in Ohio over the 1964-1995 crop years. The 
parameters of the analysis were the same as those described above for the time of harvest 
analysis14• Compared with routine hedged storage (i.e., storing every year), Working's basis 
strategy doubled the average returns to hedged storage at the 50 percent harvest date (Figure 
6). Furthermore, the strategy was statistically able at the five percent test level to discriminate 
among which years to store. The same general results were found for the 10 and 90 percent 
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harvest completion dates. Using shorter periods of analysis, Heifner (1966) and Tomek (1987) 
also found that the basis strategy increased returns to hedged storage. 
In contrast, Working's basis strategy did not improve returns to unhedged storage at the 
50 percent harvest completion date (Figure 5). In fact, average returns to unhedged storage 
were nominally lower during years in which the basis indicated that storage should occur 
relative to years in which the basis indicated that storage should not occur. However, the 
difference was not statistically significant. The basis strategy was also unable to increase 
returns to unhedged storage at the 10 percent and 90 percent harvest completion dates. In 
short, Working's basis strategy offered no ability to enhance returns to unhedged storage. 
Compared with storage arbitrage strategies, the evidence regarding production response 
hedging is less definitive. Production response hedging strategy involves placing a hedge in 
output and/or input futures whenever the expected profit from production based on expected 
expenses and current futures prices (adjusted via the basis to local conditions) exceed some 
specified level. In essence, the market is signaling to producers to increase production. 
Hedging is a way to lock in this expected profit. It is analogous to locking in a storage return 
through hedging. The existence of a production response incentive is controversial because 
rational expectation theory suggests that the market should incorporate expected producer 
response to current prices. Thus, this incentive should not exist. 
As a group, studies of production response hedging have found that this market forecast 
based strategy may enhance returns and/or reduce risk, although it is important to emphasize 
that it is not uncommon for studies to find that the strategy does not increase income or reduce 
risk. This literature is summarized in Johnson, Zulauf, Irwin, and Gerlow (1991). 
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The existing production response hedging studies were conducted using extremely small 
samples and did not use appropriate statistical techniques. In a recent study, Irwin, Zulauf, 
and Jackson (1996) found no statistically significant evidence of mean reversion in agricultural 
futures prices when appropriate statistical techniques were used. Mean reversion is probably a 
needed attribute of price behavior for profit-margin hedging to be a successful strategy15 • 
Nevertheless, the existing literature regarding production response hedging suggests the need 
for further research using appropriate statistical techniques. If such a hedging strategy is found 
to enhance income (or reduce risk), it would be a valuable tool for field crop producers who 
no longer have acreage decisions dictated by government programs. 
Marketing Strategies Using Individual-Generated Forecasts 
Grossman and Stiglitz's model of market efficiency implies that positive trading returns 
can be earned by those who are the first to acquire new information or who possess superior 
analytical ability. As discussed earlier, positive returns can be earned because information is 
costly and because markets are human institutions and, thus, need to learn (i.e., analyze) new 
information. Hence, P in the price bias equation may not equal 1. 
Large traders, especially those involved in producing or transforming commodities, are 
immersed in national and international information flows. They also have access to more 
resources than small traders. Because of these advantages, Grossman and Stiglitz's model 
implies that large traders should make most of the money from trading on futures and options 
markets. In contrast, because of their limited ability to be among the first to acquire new 
information, small traders should lose money as a group. 
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These implications are supported by several studies of traders' returns. Hartzmark 
(1987) analyzed the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's data on the position of large 
traders in nine markets over the period 1977-1981. Large hedgers had gross trading profits of 
$728 million, large speculators made $125 million, while small traders lost $853 million 
(Table 4). Leuthold, Garcia, and Lu (1994) found that large traders in frozen pork bellies 
were able to generate significant profits over the period 1982-1990, while Phillips and Weiner 
(1994) found that major oil companies earned significant profits from forward trades of Brent 
Blend crude oil over the 1983-1989 period. Both of these studies attribute the significant 
profits of larger traders to superior information and/or forecasting ability. Last, Irwin, 
Krukemyer, and Zulauf (1993) found that public commodity pools earned significant gross 
trading returns 16 • The findings of each of these studies of traders' returns are inconsistent with 
Fama's definition of efficiency, but are consistent with Grossman and Stiglitz's model of 
market performance17 • 
While the above results seem to suggest that traders with superior forecasting ability 
can earn trading returns, the more pertinent question for most agricultural producers, including 
crop farmers, is whether small traders can "out-forecast" the market. Hartzmark's (1987) 
analysis implies that small traders lose money as a group. However, it is possible that these 
small traders were not using the best forecasting methods. 
A review of the pricing efficiency of agricultural futures markets by Garcia, Hudson, 
and Waller (1988) found the evidence mixed in regard to whether forecasting models can 
improve upon the forecast performance of futures markets. The percent of studies in which 
forecast models performed better than futures markets varied by commodity (inefficiency was 
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more common in livestock than crops), by period of analysis, by forecast horizon, and by 
method of analysis (inefficiency was more common with tests involving past prices than public 
information). A review of economic forecasting in agriculture by Allen (1994, p. 105) found 
that econometric and other multivariate models do slightly worse than the naive no change 
forecast. Trend extrapolation and exponential smoothing perform the worst. Vector 
autocorrelation was the best performing forecast method, although Allen argues that it has 
generally been compared with relatively weak alternatives. In his overview of commodity 
futures prices as forecasts, Tomek (1997) argues that futures markets may have low forecast 
ability, but model-based forecasts will generally do no better because markets are efficient. 
Irwin, Gerlow, and Liu (1994) found no significant difference between the forecast 
accuracy of live hog and live cattle futures prices and U.S. Department of Agriculture expert 
predictions over the period 1980-1991. Bessler and Brandt ( 1992) found that the forecast of 
cattle prices by the expert they evaluated outperformed the live cattle futures market over the 
period 1972-1986; however, the expert's forecasts regarding hog prices did not outperform the 
live hog futures markets. Kastens and Schroeder (1996) found that Kansas City wheat futures 
outperformed econometric forecasting over the 1947 to 1995 period. Lukac, Brorsen, and 
Irwin (1988) and Lukac and Brorsen (1990) found that several technical trading systems earned 
significant risk-adjusted profits above transaction costs. However, it appear that to earn 
consistent profits, technical trading systems must be used with a portfolio of markets, not just 
a single market. 
In evaluating these mixed findings with respect to the performance of publicly available 
forecasts, it is useful to keep in mind an article by Tomek and Querin (1984). They show 
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through a simulation exercise that, even if prices are generated by a random walk process, 
price trends (after the fact) will exist. It is likely that historical analysis will discover some 
technical trading rule that was profitable over the period analyzed. The same conclusion can 
be reached with regard to any type of forecasting model. Hence, the expectation is that 
forecasting studies will find mixed evidence regarding market efficiency and trading 
profitability. What is more important is whether consistent results are found repeatedly for a 
given forecasting model. On this score, the evidence is fairly clear: no publicly available 
forecasting model has been found to generate consistent trading profits when applied to a 
single market. 
Another area of investigation recently has emerged that falls somewhere between the 
large trader return studies and the public price forecasting studies. This area focuses on 
evaluating the performance of advisory services who provide marketing assistance to farmers. 
Because of their on-going collection and evaluation of information, it is possible that these 
services may be able to enhance farmer income. The available studies have focused on corn 
and soybeans. They include Gehrt and Good (1993); Martines-Filho (1996), and Good, Irwin, 
Jackson, and Price (1997). Taken together, these studies hint that market advisory services 
may be able to enhance income relative to the returns obtained from selling at harvest. 
Robustness of the results is limited by extremely small samples and by the considerable 
variance in performance by advisory service and crop. Nevertheless, the early evidence 
indicates that additional investigation is warranted. 
In summary, the available evidence on individual-generated forecasts is largely 
consistent with an efficient market at least in the Grossman and Stiglitz's sense. This finding 
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should not come as a surprise. According to Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1991), market 
efficiency is expected when investors play for significant stakes, investors have sustained 
opportunities for practice, economic selection eliminates non-rational traders, and poaching 
(i.e., arbitrage) opportunities can be seized readily. These characteristics describe futures and 
options markets where entry is easy, trading opportunities exist daily, loses are visible daily, 
and loses are magnified through the leverage provided by margin money. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FARMER MARKETING STRATEGIES 
The available evidence regarding returns to routine strategies using crop futures and 
options is generally pessimistic. In particular, there is no evidence that a routine drought 
premium exists in pre-harvest quotes of new crop futures. The available evidence regarding 
returns to systematic strategies is mixed at best and the performance of systematic strategies 
appear to vary by crop. These conclusion are of seminal importance because routine and 
systematic strategies can be used by anybody. In contrast, there is evidence that individuals 
can beat the market, although the number who can consistently do so is small. The primary 
attributes of these individuals are that they have superior access to information and/or possess 
superior analytical ability. These two conclusions are consistent with Grossman and Stiglitz's 
model of market efficiency. Hence, for most field crop producers marketing strategies have 
limited ability to enhance income. In a sense, this conclusion reaffirms the no-free lunch rule. 
On its surface the preceding paragraph seems to drip with pessimism, but we suggest 
that in fact in contains a powerful directive for producers: a Grossman and Stiglitz's world of 
market efficiency underscores the importance of cost of production relative to marketing when 
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it comes to long term survival in a commodity market. With few exceptions, the field crop 
producers who survive will be those who have the lowest cost of production since efforts to 
improve revenue through better marketing of the commodity produced will meet with limited 
success over time. Producers will increase their probability of long-term survival by using 
their scarce resources to first maximize their production efficiency before chasing the allure of 
marketing profits. In other words, a good marketing program starts with a good program for 
managing and controlling cost of production. This axiom needs to be incorporated into every 
marketing program. 
Furthermore, we suggest that all is not lost for individual producers when it comes to 
enhancing income from prudent marketing. One example is to base storage decisions on when 
a producer harvests the crop relative to the national harvest of the crop. Stated more broadly, 
an effective marketing program begins with first learning and practicing effective cash 
marketing. Another example is to base storage decisions on whether the current basis exceeds 
the cost of storage, and then to use hedging to assure an expected positive return. This 
strategy involves using futures markets as an information input. Stated more broadly, 
producers need to begin using futures and option markets as a source of information, rather 
than just as a pricing and trading medium. 
We end by noting the rather poor performance of econometric and other economic 
models in predicting future prices. This is not to say that such models are useless. In a world 
where information is costly, learning is not instantaneous, and the economic system is in a 
constant state of change; economic model building is likely to be an important part of 
improving our understanding of the economic world. The value of economic model building 
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is not in forecasting prices better than the futures markets, but in helping us understand market 
parameters and in devising less costly means to analyze and collect information. 
24 
ENDNOTES 
1. Fama (1970) referred to the definition used here as strong-form efficient in his 1970 
article and as tests for private information in his 1991 sequel article. 
2. For an excellent discussion of the impacts and controversies surrounding the Efficient 
Market Theory in the context of the stock market see Ball ( 1996). 
3. While the random walk price process is a useful pedagogical tool, the martingale price 
process has supplanted it within the efficient market literature. An excellent discussion 
of the efficient market theory and its relationship to the random walk and martingale 
price processes is provided by LeRoy ( 1989). Both the martingale and random walk 
imply that, given the information set available at time t, the best guess of price at t+ 1 is 
the price at t and that the expected change in price is zero. The difference between the 
two price processes is that a martingale rules out a relationship between the expected 
mean price change and the information set available at t, whereas the random walk rules 
out this relationship and any other relationship involving higher conditional moments of 
price changes and the information set at t. 
4. See Brorsen and Irwin (1996) for a more thorough discussion of Grossman and Stiglitz's 
model of noisy rational expectations and its relationship to Fama's model, which is 
similar to Muth's rational expectation model (1961). 
5. It is worth emphasizing that this discussion of marketing strategies occurs within the 
context of a competitive market with homogenous products. In a market with 
differentiated products, a different and more diverse set of marketing strategies apply, 
often described as revolving around price, product positioning, promotion, and place. 
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6. Transaction costs include brokerage fees and liquidity costs. Currently, brokerage fees 
are commonly cited as $50 for a round-trip futures trade and $30 per single option trade 
(Good, Irwin, Jackson, and Price, 1997). Liquidity costs are payments earned by floor 
traders (scalpers) for filling an order to sell at the market. They have been estimated to 
be one price tick (114 cent per bushel for grain futures and 118 cent per bushel for grain 
options) for the more heavily traded nearby contracts and two price ticks for the more 
lightly traded contracts that are more than 5 months from delivery (Brorsen and Nielsen, 
1986, and Thompson and Waller, 1987). Summing these two components, transaction 
costs are at least $75 for a round-trip futures trade and $36.25 for a single option trade. 
7. If futures are used for pre-harvest selling, cash flow requirements may be significant due 
to margin calls (Alexander, 1996). The same cash flow consideration does not exist 
when purchasing put options, but a premium must be paid when the put is purchased. 
8. Among the other agricultural commodities examined, Kolb found strong evidence of 
normal backwardation in feeder cattle, live cattle, live hogs, and frozen concentrated 
orange juice futures contracts. Some evidence in support of normal backwardation was 
found for soy oil and soy meal futures contracts. 
9. For a complete discussion of the procedures, see Leeds, Zulauf, and Irwin (1992b). 
10. Bessembinder (1992) also investigated live cattle, world sugar, and a portfolio of the five 
agricultural commodities. Returns only were significant when hedgers were net short for 
the portfolio. Returns averaged 11 percent on an annual basis. 
11. Bessembinder and Chan (1992) also investigated live cattle. A significant relationship 
was found between futures returns and both the three-month Treasury bill yield and the 
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dividend yield on the equity index. They also found that the macro-economic variables 
possessed statistically significant power to predict futures returns when the four 
agricultural commodities were evaluated as a group using a Chi-Square test. 
12. There is considerable disagreement about whether these pricing anomalies generate 
trading returns which are consistent with a time-varying risk premium or whether they 
generate abnormal trading returns (i.e., they are price anomalies). 
13. For a more detailed discussion of basis forecast procedures see Tomek (1997). 
14. For a complete discussion of the calculation, see Leeds, Zulauf, and Irwin (1992a). 
15. This observation is based on the argument that over time prices should equal the cost of 
production in a competitive market. If the output price offers a profit for production and 
producers respond to this profit, this price will decline toward the cost of production as 
production expands. The reverse should happen if output price signals a loss. Hence, 
price reverts to the cost of production, or its mean value in a competitive market. 
16. Irwin, Krukemyer, and Zulauf (1993) found that, after adjusting for costs and risk, 
public commodity pools do not earn abnormal profits despite their large and significant 
gross trading returns. 
17. Fama (1991) reached the same conclusion with respect to the literature on private 
information in the stock market, i.e., private information exists which generates 
abnormal trading returns. An example is information possessed by corporate insiders. 
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TABLE 1. Price of Harvest Futures at Selected Times before Harvest Minus Harvest-time 
Price of Harvest Futures, December Corn and November Soybean Futures, 1952 -1996. 
A veragc Price Price Difference by Date Before Harvest 
of Harvest 
Year Futures at September 1 July 1 May 1 March 1 
Harvest" 
Com (4/bushel) b 
1952 - 1996 197 1.19 7.21 2.65 2.79 
(0.37) (l.21) (0.44) (0.47) 
1952 - 1973 133 -0.47 0.28 -2.07 -2.35 
(-0.31) (0.08) (-0.42) (-0.40) 
1974 - 1996 259 2.78 13.83 7.16 7.72 
(0.44) (l.25) (0.65) (0.76) 
1952 - 1962 127 2.34 3.91 4.95 5.18 
(l.55) (l.47) (l.96) (2.49*) 
1963 - 1973 138 -3.28 -3.34 -9.09 -9.88 
(-1.34) (-0.50) (-0.97) (-0.86) 
1974 - 1984 280 4.89 2.05 1.11 4.02 
(0.61) (0.12) (0.06) (0.24) 
1985 - 1996 239 0.85 24.63 12.71 11.10 
(0.09) (1. 79) ( 1.12) (0.90) 
Soybeans (4/bushel) 
1952 - 1996 458 5.07 9.66 -2.13 -5.40 
(0.73) (0.83) (-0.15) (-0.41) 
1952 - 1973 277 0.84 2.95 -13.36 -13.34 
(0.12) (0.54) (-2.59*) (-1.81) 
1974 - 1996 632 9.12 16.09 8.62 2.20 
(0.77) (0.72) (0.32) (0.09) 
1952 - 1962 246 -5.17 3.11 -4.66 -0.65 
(-1.41) (0.45) (-0.90) (-0.10) 
1963 - 1973 307 6.85 2.79 -22.06 -26.02 
(0.49) (0.32) (-2.64*) (-2.09) 
1974 - 1984 675 -2.39 -19.30 -25.11 -19.30 
(-0.13) (-0.50) (-0.49) (-0.43) 
1985 - 1996 592 19.67 48.52 39.54 21.90 
(l.25) (2.28*) (l.91) (0.89) 
•Harvest is defined as November 1 for soybeans and December l for com. 
b The t-test is reported in the parenthesis for the null hypothesis: Price of Harvest Futures before Harvest Minus Price 
of Harvest Futures at Harvest= 0. * indicates significance at 5 percent test level using a two-tailed test. 
·SOURCE: original calculations 
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TABLE 2. Average Return to Selling Put Options at Selected Times before Harvest a, 
Corn and Soybean September and Harvest Futures Options, 1985 - 1996. 
Return to Selling Put Option by Date Before Handt 
Year September l July l May l March l 
Corn September Option (~/bushel) 
1985 - 1996 NA 9.98 7.67 9.01 
(2.66*) (l.40) ( 1.22) 
1990 - 1996 NA 8.25 1.70 4.64 
(1.27) (0.22) (0.45) 
Corn December Option (~/bushel) 
1985 - 1996 2.32 12.78 8.00 8.08 
(0.49) (1.51) (l.39) (1.45) 
1990 - 1996 5.70 16.09 10.41 11.l l 
(079) (l.23) ( l.19) ( l.35) 
Soybean September Option (~/bushel) 
1985 - 1996 NA 7.26 10.3 l 8.52 c 
(0.88) (0.89) (0.64) 
1990 - 1996 NA -0.10 -0.45 l.66 
(-0.10) (-0.04) (0. l l) 
Soybean November Option (~/bushel) 
1985 - 1996 9.68 15.79 18.29 20.47 
( 1.2 l) (l.26) (l.29) ( l.40) 
1990 - 1996 10.71 4.45 11.45 14.34 
(0.87) (0.32) (0.90) (0.95) 
NA - not applicable 
•The put option position is closed on the 15th day of the month before the delivery month of 
the futures contract or the last day of trading, whichever came first. 
b The t-test is reported in the parenthesis for the null hypothesis: return to option position = 0. 
* indicates significance at 5 percent test level using a two-tailed test. 
c The soybean September option price was not available for March 1, 1985. 
SOURCE: original calculations 
34 
TABLE 3. Average Return to Various Marketing Strategies, 21 Illinois Fanns, Corn and 
Soybeans, 1985 -1995. 
I Com I Soybean 
Strate~ I Mean t-statistic" \ Mean t-statistic" 
Gross Production Retumsb ($/acre) 
Sell at Harvest 303 NA 251 NA 
Sell Futures on May 1 ° 319 0.82 266 1.56 
Buy Sept. Put on May l d 319 2.04 260 l.30 
Buy Harvest Put on May l 0 310 0.93 259 0.97 
Gross Trading Returns to Futures or Option Position (4/ bushel) 
Sell Futures on May l 0 11.0 0.90 33.8 1.66 
Buy Sept. Put on May l d 10.6 2.07 15.4 l.35 
Buy Harvest Put on May l 0 4.9 0.85 14.6 1.02 
•The t-statistic for gross production returns per acre is for the null hypothesis: gross returns 
with pre-harvest strategy - gross returns from selling at harvest = 0. The t-statistic for gross 
trading returns is for the null hypothesis: gross trading return = 0. 
b Gross return for selling at harvest equals cash price during the week in which 50 percent of 
the Illinois crop is harvested times the farm's yield. Gross return for the other marketing 
strategies includes the return from selling futures or buying the put. It is assumed that 100 
percent of expected production (five-year moving average of yield minus high and low yield) 
is sold before harvest. 
c Futures and harvest put positions are closed out on the same date the cash sale is made, i.e. 
the week in which 50 percent of the Illinois crop is harvested. 
d September put option position is closed on the 15th day of August or the last day of trading, 
whichever came first. 
SOURCE: original calculations 
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TABLE 4. Gross Trading Returns Earned by Traders Grouped According to 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Data on Position of Large Traders, Selected 
Commodities, 1977-1981. 
Gross Trading Returns (Million $) 
Large Large Small 
Commodity Hedger Speculator Trader 
Oats 9.63 0.64 -10.28 
Wheat a 66.73 13.53 -80.30 
Pork Bellies 79.05 1.48 -80.56 
Live Cattle -130.27 197.12 -66.85 
Feeder Cattle 29.13 75.42 -104.55 
T-bonds 559.09 -169.07 -390.02 
T-bills 114.96 5.48 -120.44 
TOTAL 728.00 125.00 -853.00 
a This includes the Chicago, Kansas City, and Minneapolis wheat futures markets. 
SOURCE: Hartzmark, pages 1298-1299. 
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Figure 1. Observed Probability of a Price Increase and Decline 
Between May 1 and November 1 on November Soybean Contract 
and May 1 and December 1 on December Corn Contract, 197 4-96 
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Figure 2. Average Price Increase and Average Price Decline 
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Figure 3. Net Return to Unhedged 
Storage by Time of Harvest, 
Ohio Corn, 1964-1995 Crop Years 
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Figure 4. Net Return to Hedged 
Storage by Time of Harvest, 
Ohio Corn, 1964-1995 Crop Years 
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Figure 6. Net Return to Hedged 
Storage by Strategy, Ohio Corn, 
1967-1995 Crop Years 
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